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Case No. 20060128-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

David Leon Bunting,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the police officer's traffic stop of defendant supported by reasonable
suspicion where he observed that one of defendant's tail lights was dimmer than the
other and pink rather than red in color?
Standard of Review. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear
error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100 P.3d 1222. It's legal conclusions,
including its application of the law to the underlying facts, are reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,115,103 P.3d 699.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601(l)(a) (West Supp. 2005)
(l)(a) A person may not operate or move and an owner may not
cause or knowingly permit to be operated or moved on a highway a
vehicle or combination of vehicles which:
***

(ii) does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped
with lamps and other equipment in proper condition and
adjustment as required in this chapter;
(iii) is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter; or

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2) (West Supp. 2005)
(2) (a) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, and any other
vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles,
shall be equipped with at least two tail lamps and two or more red
reflectors mounted on the rear.
(b)(i) Except as provided under Subsections (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c), and
Section 41-6a-1612, all stop lamps or other lamps and reflectors
mounted on the rear of a vehicle shall display or reflect a red color.
* * *

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1618(l) (West Supp. 2005)
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2), a person may not use,
have for sale, sell, or offer for sale for use on or as a part of the
equipment of a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or pole trailer any
head lamp, auxiliary fog lamp, rear lamp, signal lamp, required
2

reflector, or any parts of that equipment which tend to change the
original design or performance, unless the part or equipment complies
with the specifications adopted under Section 41- 6a-1601.
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) do not apply to equipment in
actual use prior to July 1, 1979 or to replacement parts of this
equipment.
(3) A person may not use on a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or
pole trailer any lamps under this section unless the lamps are mounted,
adjusted, and aimed in accordance with this part.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
Defendant was charged by Information with possession of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone, possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone,
and driving on a revoked driver's license. R. 2-1. Following a preliminary hearing,
the case was bound over for trial. R. 15. Defendant thereafter moved to suppress
the evidence, arguing that the officer's perception of the color of defendant's tail
light was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. R. 23-26. After hearing
argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 32-31,52-49,75. Pursuant
i

to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
reduced to a third degree felony, and the remaining charges were dismissed R. 4538. In pleading guilty, defendant reserved his right to appeal the trial court's order
denying his motion to suppress. R. 42. The court sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years. R. 55. The court suspended the
sentence and placed defendant on 36 months of supervised probation. R. 55-54.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 68.

3

Summary of Facts
While on patrol just after midnight on April 19,2005, Officer Craig Martinez
observed defendant driving a white van westbound on 400 North Street in Orem,
Utah. R. 74: 5-6. Officer Martinez noticed that the right taillight "appeared to be
pink rather than red" and "was much dimmer than the left taillight." R. 74: 6.
Officer Martinez stopped the van based on the faulty-looking taillight and disovered
that the tail lamp was broken and covered with a red plastic folder. R. 74: 6, 10.
Defendant gave Officer Martinez an Arizona driver's license. R. 74:6. A computer
check verified that the Arizona license was valid. R. 74: 6. However, it also
indicated that defendant had a Utah license that had been revoked less than three
weeks earlier for an alcohol violation. R. 74:6. Officer Martinez arrested defendant
for driving on a revoked license. R. 74:7. In a search of defendant's person incident
to arrest, Officer Martinez discovered a glass pipe in defendant's left front pocket.
R. 74: 7. In a search of defendant's van incident to arrest, he discovered additional
paraphernalia and a plastic spoon with "a half gram of meth." R. 74: 8.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in relying on the officer's
"subjective perception" that defendant's tail lamp was pink in color and dimmer
than the other tail lamp. This argument lacks merit. Although an officer's
subjective intentions and motives are irrelevant in assessing the reasonableness of a
search or seizure, a court may properly consider an officer's subjective

4

determinations of fact, such as the color of a light The officer's observations here
supported a reasonable suspicion that defendant violated the Utah Traffic Code.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE OFFICER
HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
BASED ON THE OFFICER'S OBSERVATION THAT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TAIL LAMP WAS PINK IN COLOR AND
DIMMER THAN THE LEFT TAIL LAMP
In its written ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court
noted that counsel for defendant placed a flashlight behind the red folder that was
the same color of the folder covering defendant's tail lamp on April 19,2005. R. 51.
The court found that the light emitted during the demonstration "was, in fact, red."
R. 51. The court observed that the red color emitted during the demonstration "was
contrary to the officer's observation [on April 19,2005] of a pink hue". R. 51. The
court noted that the State objected to the in-court demonstration as evidence and
urged the court to limit its findings to the officer's testimony. R. 51. The court
"agree[d] with the State's position and [found] that although the folder was red, the
tape was red, and the light emitted from via [sic] the use of the flashlight was red,
the Court is limited by the officer's observation." R. 52.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in "f[inding] that the
officer's subjective perception of the tail lamp coloring was controlling despite the
[c]ourt's findings that the taillight was in conformance with statutory
requirements." Aplt. Brf. at 10. Defendant contends that the trial court should not
have relied on "the officer's subjective perception of the tail lamp coloring," but was
5

instead bound by its "own objective observation" of the coloring. Aplt. Brf. at 10,
15. Defendant's argument lacks merit.
At the outset, the trial court did not find that "the taillight was in
conformance with statutory requirements." Aplt. Brf. at 10. The court found that
the light emitted in the demonstration was red. R. 51. It did not find that the taillight
was red or otherwise in conformance with applicable standards.
Defendant suggests that in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to the
demonstration, the trial court erroneously concluded that an "officer's perceptions
are not subject to review" and it was thus "bound by the officer's subjective beliefs."
Aplt. Brf. at 11. That was not the reason.
Although the trial court did not explain the reason for sustaining the objection
in its written ruling, see R. 52-50, it did so at the suppression hearing. The court first
asked whether "there [was] any question as to the testimony of the officer that it
was simply one was dimmer than the other and pinker than the other." R. 75: 5.
The prosecutor responded, "There's no contrary evidence, to the State's
knowledge." R. 75: 5. Defense counsel likewise responded, "I agree there's no
contrary—or nothing to contradict that." The court then ruled:
Well, despite the fine demonstration by Mr. Carter, I can't be sure
that is an accurate representation of what happened that night; and so I
have to rely upon the testimony of the only witness I had, who was the
officer, who testified that what he saw was one light that was
considerably dimmer than the other, that it was not showing a red
color;
So I find based on testimony that I have in front of me upon which I
can rely, casting aside the rather unscientific demonstration, that I must
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rely upon the testimony of the officer, which was that the light was
enough dimmer; that it was not red in color; that it was more pink in
color.
Despite—and I make this ruling. Despite all of the explanations in
Mr. Carter's motion about various colors and hues, but I've got what I
got; and that's all I have. That it was a lighter color, it was dimmer;
and I find that that did constitute [reasonable suspicion]
R. 75: 5-6.
The court thus discounted the demonstration not because the court believed it
was necessarily bound by the officer's testimony, but because the demonstration
was not reliable. It did not sufficiently duplicate the conditions on April 19,2005 so
as to create an "accurate representation" of the taillight's color when Officer
Martinez observed it.1 Accordingly, the court correctly observed that it was left only
with the testimony of Officer Martinez. As conceded by defense counsel, there was
"nothing [else] to contradict that" testimony. R. 75: 5. Although defendant could
have testified otherwise, he did not take the witness stand. The trial court's reliance
on the officer's testimony was proper.

1

At the suppression hearing, the trial court noted that Officer Martinez
testified that the red plastic folder introduced at the preliminary hearing as
Defendant's Exhibit 1 was "something like" the red folder which covered
defendant's taillight, not necessarily the "exact" folder. R. 75: 3; accord R. 74: 11
(officer testifying that the covering over defendant's tail lamp "appear[ed] to be
something like" Exhibit 1 and was "very similar" to it). The color emitted from the
flashlight depends on whether the red plastic is folded into four layers (as presently
constituted in Exhibit 1) or not folded at all. Officer Martinez did not testify
regarding the manner in which the plastic covered the tail lamp and the record does
not indicate in what condition the plastic was when defense counsel placed the
flashlight behind it.
7

Citing decisions from the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme
Court, and this Court, defendant argues that the trial court nevertheless erred in
relying on the officer's "subjective perception" of the taillight's color. Aplt. Brf. at
10. The cases cited by defendant do not support that proposition.
The cases cited by defendant support the well-settled principle that the
reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-22 (1968); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S 128,137 (1978); State v.
Warren, 2003 UT 36,114,78 P.3d 590; State v. Royball, 716 P.2d 291,293 (Utah 1986);
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,1228
(Utah App. 1997). Under this standard, an officer's motive for acting is irrelevant.
See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding that searches are examined "without regard to the
underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved"); accord Brigham City v.
Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943,1948 (2006) (holding that "[t]he officer's subjective motivation
is irrelevant"). An officer's subjective understanding of the legal justification for
acting is also irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding that "the fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action"); accord
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,153 (2004) (same); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806,813 (1996) (same); United States v. Robinson, 4tU U.S 218,236 (1973) (holding that
"it is of no moment that [the officer]... did not himself suspect that respondent was
armed").

8

The foregoing cases do notsuggest that an officer's perception of facts is
irrelevant in the court's objective assessment of reasonableness. To the contrary, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Devenpeck held that "an officer's state of mind (except for the
facts that he knows) is irrelevant" under the objective standard. 543 U.S. at 153
(emphasis added). In Warren, the Utah Supreme Court likewise recognized that
courts may consider an officer's "subjective factual determination[s]" when applying
the objective test. 2003 UT 36, % 20 (emphasis added). The objective test requires
the court to identify the facts known to the officer and then undertake "an objective
assessment of [the] officer's actions in light of [those] facts." Scott, 543 U.S. at 137
(emphasis added).
Defendant's reliance on State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41,107 P.3d 706, is also
misplaced. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. In Chism, an officer stopped a vehicle and
observed evidence that defendant and the other occupants were in possession of
tobacco. 2005 UT App 41, \ 3. Suspecting that Chism was not old enough to legally
possess tobacco, the officer asked him for identification. Id. at 14. Chism's driver's
license indicated that he was in fact 19 years old. Id. Although the license
"appeared to be valid and the picture on the license appeared to be Chism's," the
officer further detained defendant to run a computer check so as to verify the
validity of the license. Id. at \ \ 4,17.
This Court held that defendant's extended detention to enable the officer to
run a computer check on the license was unreasonable. The court held that Chism's
driver's license "provide [d] what amounts to a rebuttable presumption of the
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bearer's true age." Id. at 1 19. The Chism court did not conclude, however, that "the
officer's personal impression of the defendant's age was irrelevant," as defendant
asserts here. Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. To the contrary, the Court recognized that "a
discrepancy between an identification card and an officer's observations might
support a reasonable suspicion that the identification is false." Chism, 2005 UT App
41, % 19. The problem in Chism was that the officer "provided no objective facts to
support his suspicion that Chism was younger than his identification stated." Id. at
1 20. The Court held that "[w]ithout such supporting facts, [the officer's] theory
that Chism's identification was false [could] only be characterized as an 'inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch' not justifying additional detention." Id.
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
In this case, there was no evidence at the scene akin to the driver's license in
Chism that would create a rebuttable presumption that defendant's tail lamp emitted
a red light, as required under the Traffic Code.

Nor did defense counsel's

demonstration at the suppression hearing create such a presumption. As noted by
the trial court, the demonstration was insufficient to assure the court of an "accurate
representation of what happened that night." R. 75: 5. In any event, unlike the
officer in Chism, the officer here identified specific and articulable facts to support
his suspicion that the tail lamp did not comply with the Traffic Code, i.e., the right
tail lamp "appeared to be pink rather than red" and "was much dimmer than the
left taillight." R. 74: 6.
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Defendant argues that a dim or pink tail lamp does not create a reasonable
suspicion of a traffic violation. Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. Defendant reasons that because
pink is a lighter shade of red, a tail lamp emitting a pink color does not violate the
statute. Aplt. Brf. at 11. He also contends that a dim tail lamp does not violate the
Code. Aplt. Brf. at 11. This argument fails.
Except for a limited number of exceptions inapplicable here, "all stop lamps
or other lamps and reflectors mounted on the rear of a vehicle shall display or reflect
a red color." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-l604(2)(b)(i) (West 2004). By its plain terms,
the statute requires that tail lamps be red in color. Had the legislature intended to
permit shades or hues of red, it would have required that tail lamps display a
"shade of red" or a "red hue." Although pink is a light shade of red, it is readily
distinguishable from the red color.
In any event, the Traffic Code provides that "[a] person may not operate or
move . . . on a highway a vehicle . . . which . . . is not at all times equipped with
lamps and other equipment in proper condition . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-61a1601(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2005). It also prohibits the use of rear lamps "which tend
to change the original design or performance" of that part. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a1618(1) (West Supp. 2005). Where Officer Martinez observed a right tail lamp that
was both dimmer and different in color than the left tail lamp, he had a reasonable
basis to believe that the right tail lamp was not in "proper condition" and did not

11

conform to the "original design or performance," as required under the Traffic
Code.2
* * *

In sum, the trial court properly relied on Officer Martinez's testimony that the
right tail lamp was dimmer than the left tail lamp and was pink in color rather than
red. These facts created a reasonable suspicion that operation of the vehicle violated
sections 41-6a-1601,41-6a-1604, and 41a-61-1618 of the Utah Traffic Code.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.

ORAL ARGUMENT
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals,
2005 UT 18,110,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cat, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).
2

The Official Vehicle Safety Inspection Manual for Passenger Vehicles and
Light Duty Trucks 2006 (SIM) requires safety inspectors to reject a safety inspection
when "[r]ear lenses do not produce red light or are covered by any lense covers."
SIM at 51. The Manual also indicates that u[l]enses that are patched, taped or covered
with a temporary substance and lenses that have been equipped with any tinted covers
MUST BE REJECTED/' SIM at 51 (emphasis in original).
12

Respectfully submitted September 25,2006.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General

S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 25, 2006, I served two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, David Leon Bunting, by
causing them to be delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows:
Shelden R. Carter
Harris & Carter
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, UT 84604

S. Gray
distant Attorney General

F:\Jgray\Bunting\Bunting Dav brf.doc
9/25/2006 4:18 PM

13

ADDENDUM

Ff LP n
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
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SHELDEN CARTER (0589)
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Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPT.
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS AND ORDERS RE:
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
vs.
Case 051401669
LEON DAVID BUNTING
Defendant.
—oooOooo—

The defendant motioned the Court to suppress evidence. The defendant argued
that the officer herein did not have sufficient cause to stop the defendant. The defendant
asserted that this was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights as secured by
both the Federal and State Constitutions.
Officer Martinez testified at the preliminary hearing that he had initiated a traffic
stop of the defendant's van on April 19, 2005. The sole basis to make the stop was van's
taillight. He testified that after midnight at 12:45 he noted a van traveling westbound on
400 North in Orem City.
He noted the right taillight was dimmer than the left taillight and appeared to be
pinkish. The officer than requested his driver's license, registration and insurance. The

d§2

officer checked the license and noted it being valid in Arizona but his license had been
revoked in Utah.
The officer than arrested Mr. Bunting. Pursuant to the search of Mr. Bunting, he
found a glass pipe in his left front pocket and noticed the pipe to have white residue in it.
Additional contraband was then later located in the van.
Upon cross-examination, the officer described the right taillight has having red
folder tape over the right tail lamp with also red tape. This was also indicated by the
officer's report. The officer did not testify relating neither to any dangers that the taillight
presented nor to any other defects in the equipment upon the van.

The officer did not

indicated that he could not see the taillight but that it did not match the left taillight in
coloring. The difference in the coloring of the two taillights was the only basis for the
stop.
The defense then introduced an exhibit which was the red folder that had been
placed over the taillight. It was the same coloring as the officer noted that evening.
The officer suggested that the red folder with the red tape produced a pinkish hue.
After the defense filed a motion to suppress, the Court set a motion hearing on the
suppression issue. At the hearing, the defense placed a flashlight behind the red folder
and the light emitted was, in fact, red. This was contrary to the officer's observation of a
pink hue.
The State objected to the exhibition of the light emitted from the red folder and
argued the only evidence the Court had before it was the officer's testimony. The State
argued that the Court is limited in its findings by the officer's testimony and the Court
must disregard the coloring of the light emitted via the flashlight to the red folder. The
Court was thereby bound by the officer's testimony.

The Court agrees with the State's position and finds that although the folder was
red, the tape was red, and the light emitted from via the use of the flashlight was red, the
Court is limited by the officer's observation.
Pursuant to these findings, the Court denies the defendant's motion to suppress.
The Court rules that since the officer noted a pinkish hue to the taillight, the officer was
justified in making this traffic stop and the resulting discovery of contraband is
admissible into evidence and not a violation of the defendant's rights as guaranteed under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art I Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution.
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